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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

HOLLAND.—INSURRECTIONS.—Alas! all the “*fond hopes*” of the Morning Post and of the “Fashionable World,” seem to have been dissipated since my last Number went to the press. Nothing short of a complete *deliverance* of Europe was then expected, and that, too, right speedily. We were taught to believe, that the Antwerp Fleet was hourly to be looked for coming down the Scheldt with the gallant crews in high mutiny, and intent upon the good work, the praiseworthy act of delivering the said fleet into our hands. To judge from the public news-papers, the Anti-Jacobins seemed to have pricked up their ears and to have been wholly recovered from the fit of apprehension, into which they had been thrown by the dear Dollar.—It was a *sham*, or a *hum*, or a *hoax*; and here we are, with all the “*fond hopes*,” all the sweet hopes, of hearing confirmed the accounts of a general insurrection in Holland and Flanders, though the Morning Chronicle assured us, that the government had received *authentic* accounts of the matter, and that it (the Chronicle) trusted that what it had before reported was *true*.—All the story, therefore, about the *Judges* being seized by the people and having their bauble, their humbug, their cheating dress, their rabble-blinding gear, stripped off from their flabby carcases; all this story is false, and I dare say, that these base miscreants, these very worst of all the instruments of tyranny, are going on cheating and oppressing and insulting and laughing at the poor Dutch as much as ever. It is not, however, the fault of these men, or their employers, half so much as it is of the Dutch themselves. Base dogs! why do they submit? Why do they not down with these tricked out instruments, these vile hypocrites, these robbers and murderers *au nom de la loi* (that is to say, in the name of the law); why do they not pull them down and drag them along the kennel?—Why, I shall be told, that they are, in fact, guarded by troops; for, though the

troops may not be *always present* with them; that there are thousands upon thousands *within call*; that they are *stationed at convenient distances all over the country*; and that if the people were to hesitate one moment to let the Judges and others rob them *au nom de la loi*, the soldiers would be called in, and the work would be consummated at the point of the bayonet.—Oh, oh! these are their tricks, are they? This is the way they do things in Holland, and in Flanders! The soldiers do not actually take people’s goods and money from them and put them in jail and otherwise ill-treat them; but, they are within call, in great abundance, if the tame cheaters meet with resistance.—Poor Dutch! Poor Flemings!—This is despotism with a vengeance! It must be ten thousand times more provoking than if it was carried on without any of the *forms of law*. These legal forms must make the most galling part of the system; and, therefore, I did not at all wonder to hear that the people had begun by seizing upon the *judges*. But, alas! it was all false. It was all a fabrication, on the part of our stupid and time-serving news-papers, who are now bringing themselves off with the most pitiful excuses.—On Friday last, the COURIER and MORNING POST told us that; “A Dutch Gentleman, just arrived from Holland, brings a letter dated the 21st inst. from one of the first houses there, which confirms the news of a complete insurrection having taken place from one end of Holland to the other; that 9000 French have already been made to bite the dust; and that both the fleets in Amsterdam and Antwerp are in a state of mutiny.”—On the next day, they came down to the following account, which the reader will do well to compare with the one just given. “The chief cause of the late disturbances in Holland was, as we stated, that HORRIBLE LAW of cruelty and blood, the CONSCRIPTION LAW. A vessel arrived yesterday, which sailed from the Dutch coast on Monday night, with several passengers who got on board by stealth. The master states, that he was at Amsterdam on

"the preceding Saturday, when the command took place. Some Conscripts of the Jewish persuasion having revolted; they were, after a considerable struggle, overpowered by the troops that escorted them, and four of them shot by way of example to the others. This act of severity occasioned a numerous mob to assemble, chiefly consisting of women, who pelted the French officers and soldiers with stones and other missiles. One officer was severely wounded on the head in the affray. The only act of outrage committed besides, was the cutting adrift some boats in which Conscripts were put for the security of conveyance. A strong French force continued to parade the streets from Saturday, until the time our informant left Amsterdam. What a HORRIBLE PICTURE OF TYRANNY does the foregoing account exhibit; and is it to be believed (no, it cannot be believed) that SUCH a system can long exist, or that it does not carry within itself the seeds and elements of its speedy dissolution?"—Look at this well, reader. So, then; there being some Conscripts, that is to say, men who had been compelled to become soldiers; there being some persons of this description, who revolted or mutinied, they were, after some struggle, subdued by the foreign troops that the tyrant Napoleon had sent into Holland. Four of them having been shot, this act of severity occasioned the people to assemble and pelt the foreign troops; and, that a STRONG PARTY OF THESE TROOPS CONTINUED, FOR SOME TIME TO PARADE THE STREETS.—Well, venal man, and what then? What next? Look me in the face, thou venal man, and tell what of all this?—Why; was it not a "horrible picture of tyranny?"—YES; yes, it was; it was a horrible picture of tyranny; and for submitting to such tyranny a nation ought to be exterminated. Base dogs! What! let these French foreigner troops beat them about in this manner? But, come; they did make a feeble attempt at resistance at any rate. The Dutch did not take it quite in silence, and seem to bless those who had brought their oppressors amongst them. They did, or, at least, some of the women did, raise their voices and their hands too, in behalf of the poor young fellows who had been forced to become soldiers, and who had been goaded on to revolt, or mutiny. The people of Amsterdam were not base enough

to look on with seeming approbation, while their countrymen, the young fellows forced into the service, were so ill treated. Yet, we cannot justify the nation. They are base dogs for submitting to such treatment; and they deserve, richly deserve, all they get, and more too.—The COURIER then asks, "is it to be believed that SUCH a system can long exist." And, he answers himself, and says, that "it cannot be believed."—Why should it not? How long have the world seen tyranny quite equal to this existing in many countries? It has in itself the seeds of destruction, we are told. Aye, but such seeds are often of very slow growth; and the plant, unfortunately, too long in ripening.—The fact is, that this system will last just as long as the government has a sufficiency of troops on its side. Men without arms cannot face men with arms. Troops are placed at convenient distances all over the country. Any rising is quelled in a moment. The revolters, who might call themselves patriots, the government would call rebels; the Judges would hang, or transport to Cayenne, all those who escaped the bayonet or musket; and, what is the most odious and detestable thing of all, the great mass of the people would stand by and utter not a word against any of the government's proceedings; nay, rather than be suspected of disaffection, they would applaud its most infamous and cruel acts.—So long as the government has a sufficient number of troops at its command, the tyranny will go on; and, the time when the government will cease to have such a number of troops, is, when it ceases to have money to pay them, and not one moment before.—Therefore, it is all nonsense; it is all beastly absurdity to talk about a revolt of the people in Holland, as long as the government is enabled to pay soldiers to shoot or stab the people. As long as it has money for this purpose, it will find no difficulty in keeping the people down. As long as it can pay a numerous army, it has nothing to fear from the people; and, the only wonder with me is, that the despotism makes use of Judges, or of any of the forms of law; unless, indeed, these are supposed to be the most efficacious of its tools. The soldiers, perhaps, would have less method in managing the affairs of taxes and the like; and so one set of tools is put to assist the other; and thus is tyranny aggravated by its complexity.—From this view of the matter it is evident, that no rational hope

of a subversion of this tyranny can be entertained, so long as the government has the means of keeping in its pay a sufficiency of bayonets. The whole thing is military. The government depends wholly upon the army; all the powers of oppression, in whatever way they may come at the people, depend upon the army; but the army depends wholly upon its PAY. Take from the despotism the means of keeping the bayonets, and the nation is free. To talk of any other mode of the poor Dutch or Flemings being able to obtain redress is worse than absurdity, because it tends to excite false hopes and to produce disappointment; nay, it might possibly induce some persons to expose themselves to useless destruction in a contest with the despotism.—Such is my view of the state of Holland and Flanders; and, my last word of advice to the people of these countries would be: remain quiet, 'till the day comes, when your despotism is left without the means of hiring bayonets, and then you will be free if you choose it.

—I know, that, for this advice, I shall be exposed to the calumnies of our venal writers, who will accuse me of a wish to prevent the people of Holland from rising at all. No, you fools, I do not entertain any such wish! I only wish the people not to afford the despotism an excuse for murdering them in detail. I wish them not to stir, till they are likely to succeed, knowing that, against a bayonet, an unarmed man is nothing; and knowing that, by one means or another, all the people are disarmed.

JUBILEE DOLLARS.—In the newspapers of this day, I see no less than forty-two pamphlets advertised, the whole of which relate to the subject of Bank Notes and Bullion.—To-morrow the grand discussion takes place in the Honourable House. The RESOLUTIONS proposed, or to be proposed, by Mr. HORNER, were inserted in my Number of the 24th of April, at page 1012. Those of the other side, which, it seems, come from Mr. NICHOLAS VANSITTART, will be found in the present Number.—Here is fire against fire, you see. *Bang for bang*, except that Mr. Vansittart returns one more shot than he receives.—In this Number I have also inserted a set of *Aphorisms* by SIR RICHARD PHILLIPS, which do certainly contain, in my opinion, ten thousand times as much sense as both the sets of Resolutions put together.—In one respect,

however, I do not agree with SIR RICHARD: I mean as to his *remedy*. He does not, indeed, seriously says, that the thing can be done which he say would be efficacious, if it were done. But, he talks as if it could be done; and, I am fully persuaded, that he knows it cannot. It is, therefore, wrong for him to sport with the feelings of the Old Lady; especially at a time like this.—In the meanwhile curious work is going on out of doors. I will here insert a string of paragraphs that have appeared in the news-papers of London, since the publication of my last Number; that the world may see, that we may have upon record, and that our children and other countries may take warning from what is now passing here.—I.—“*Nefarious Traffic in Gold.* A seizure of “10,000*l.* was yesterday made at the “Custom-house, of gold, in bars, regularly entered and sworn to at Guildhall “as foreign gold. The boxes had passed “the Custom-house, and were on board “ship when the discovery was made. It “is supposed that some person employed “in the melting of it into bars, gave in-“formation that guineas were melted with “the foreign gold. The Custom-house “Officers are still searching the vessel, it “being suspected that much has been se-“cretly put amongst the other goods.”

—II.—“*Alarming Riot at Sampford Peverell.* On Monday last a disturbance, “of a very serious nature, occurred at “Sampford Peverell. The annual fair, “for the sale of cattle, &c. was held there “on that day. On the Saturday preceding, a number of the workmen, employ-“ed in excavating the bed of the Grand “Western Canal, assembled at Wellington “for the purpose of obtaining change “for the payment of their wages, which “there has been lately considerable diffi-“culty in procuring. Many of them in-“dulged in inordinate drinking, and com-“mitted various excesses at Tiverton, and “other places to which they had gone for “the purpose above stated. On Monday “the fair at Sampford seemed to afford a “welcome opportunity for the gratifica-“tion of their tumultuary disposition. “Much rioting took place in the course “of the day, and towards evening a body “of these men, consisting of not less than “300, had assembled in the village. Mr. “Chave (whose name we had occasion to “mention in unravelling the imposture “respecting the Sampford Ghost) was “met on the road, and recognized by

"some of the party. Opprobrious language was applied to him, but whether on that subject, or not, we have not been informed. The rioters followed him to the House, the windows of which they broke; and, apprehensive of further violence, Mr. Chave considered it necessary to his defence to discharge a loaded pistol at the assailants. This unfortunately took effect, and one man fell dead on the spot. A pistol was also fired by a person within the house, which so severely wounded another man that his life is despaired of. A carter, employed by Mr. Chave, was most dreadfully beaten by the mob. Additional numbers were accumulating when our accounts were sent off, and we understand their determination was to pull down the house."

III.—"Hoarding. A respectable correspondent observes, that the hoarding of cash by farmers, servants, and country people, is of a magnitude beyond what writers on the subject of specie are aware of; a robbery or death now and then throws some light on the facts. In the West of England, most of the farmers keep by them from thirty to a hundred guineas in gold, and some considerably more. A few days ago, a wealthy yeoman declared he had three thousand guineas in his house, the possession of which was more pleasure to him than an accumulating interest. The writer knows numerous servants, who have from twenty to eighty guineas in gold by them, and believes this hoarding to be general among the middling and common class of the people. The amount of gold thus concealed must be immense; perhaps the withholding this coin from circulation may have prevented some from being clandestinely sent out of the kingdom; yet that evil will bear no comparison to the detriment society experiences, by the entire disappearance and want of the intended use designed by the Legislature."—IV.

—"New Silver Coinage.—We are assured, from undoubted authority, that the new Silver Coinage is in great forwardness, particularly dollars, which will be issued speedily; in consequence of which, the holders of the old silver suffer greatly, as many of the shillings and sixpences will fall very short of their present value."

—V. "Gold Exported. The following entries of Bullion were made at the Custom-house in the course of last week: For Dunkirk, 1514 oz. of gold in bars;

" 1170 oz. gold coin; 2517 oz. silver coin. "For Ostend, 477 oz. gold coin; 6467 oz. silver coin."—VI "Mock Bank Notes. A number of mock notes, for a penny, fabricated obviously in imitation of the one pound notes of the Bank of England, are at present in circulation. After the words, "for the Governor and Company of the," the words "King's Bench and Fleet" are inserted in an upper line, in very small characters; and the remainder of the sentence concludes "Bank in (instead of of) England." The hackney-coachmen are the principal putters off of these notes. A person who asks change of a two pound note from one of these gentry, particularly at night, rarely escapes being cheated."—VII.—"New Dollars. On Friday the Bank issued new stamped dollars to the several bankers, to the amount of 300*l.* each house. A further issue is expected in the course of this week."—Here it is in all ways: Alarms and threatenings and coaxings and puffings. Aye! but all will not do. If this venal man (all the paragraphs are from the COURIER of the 27, 29, and 30th of April); if this venal man lie the current of the Thames back to Oxfordshire, then, indeed, I should begin to suppose it possible for him to turn the current of the paper money; but, until he can do the former, he may be well assured that all his attempts at the latter will fail.—I am, however, pleased to see him at work in this way; for, as he writes for the instruction of the full-blooded Anti-Jacobins in the country; as it is to them he looks for customers, they may, perhaps, believe what he says, and be thereby induced to go on confiding in the Old Lady to the last. I hope they will. This will be the proper, the just and appropriate, punishment for them. They will then be caught in their own trap; choaked in their own halter.—They would, at this moment be in wondrous high spirits, were it not for the Dollar, the dear Dollar! This hangs about them, and damps their joy. Were it not for this, they would be so insolent, that it would be impossible to walk in the same street with them. They would actually trample people under their feet. This hangs about them. This haunts them. This weighs upon their mind. It comes athwart them in the midst of their pleasant reveries. Even while they are exulting in the hope of being able to put their feet on the necks of the Jacobins, it

shoots into their minds and mars all their felicity. It has its influence with them at moments when they have forgotten it. They are not *thinking* of it; but, still there is, they feel, *a something* at the bottom of their hearts that makes them afraid. They ask themselves what it is; they say, "why are we not happy? What is it "that makes us apprehensive?"—And, then, the Dollar, the infallible proof of depreciation, presents itself.—Now, in whatever degree these alarms are removed from their mind by the puffs in the CURIER, that paper does good; because the tendency of its effects is to make any of the Anti-Jacobins, who now confide in the Old Lady, continue to confide in her, the effect of which will inevitably procure for them their just reward. Let all the Anti-Jacobins confide in her to the end! And, indeed, they ought to be *made* to confide in her. She, I am sure, has been a support to them. She has been their nursing-mother. If it had not been for her their cause would have been ruined fifteen if not eighteen years ago. She and they have indeed been the prop of each other. The support has been mutual. Aye, and they feel to the very bottom of their souls, that their fate is wound up in hers; that she and they must stand, or fall, together; and this feeling it is that haunts them night and day.—The discussion, which is to take place to-morrow, will be a memorable one. Hitherto we have seen nothing but *reports* and *pamphlets*. We shall now have the *speeches* of the honourable House upon the subject. When we have them; when we have before us not only the *schemes* but the *arguments* also, both of the INS and the OUTS, we will then take up the matter; we Jacobins will let the world see, whether we do not know as much about the thing as those do, who call us a "*low degraded crew*."—Every one of the pamphleteers, who acknowledge a depreciation in the Notes, has his *remedy*; amongst the others DAVIS GIDDY, the steady defender of the *borough*-system, has his *remedy*. But, poor DAVIS, whose head, as an *author* at least (for as such, I may speak freely of him) is none of the clearest, does not seem to perceive how dreadfully this *remedy* of his would operate upon the *borough* system, which, he contends, is necessary to the *preservation of the constitution*.—This is a *very shallow man*. I thought that SIR JOHN SINCLAIR, MR. BOASE, and the five or six

"LEARNED FRIENDS," who have upon this occasion, added to the raw material of the Trunk-Maker, were unparalleled in point of coxcomical stupidity; but, really, "DAVIS GIDDY, Esq." as he calls himself, seems to have fair pretensions to a preference before them all, the wise Baronet only excepted. But, it has just shot into my head, that DAVIS himself is a "*learned friend*." The wonder ceases! It is under the hands of "Learned friends" that the Nation has been for the last 28 years. Every minister since that time has been a *lawyer*. A greater bulk of laws have been passed since that time than was passed before from the time that England was called England. All has been law, and all power has been in the hands of lawyers.—The Old Lady has, amongst the rest, been under their care; and much good may it do her!—DAVIS GIDDY, Esq. discovers, I think, a greater degree of stupidity than SIR JOHN SINCLAIR, though I say this somewhat doubtfully; for Sir JOHN's pamphlet really is a wonder in its way. But DAVIS has an air of *profundity*; and a sort of metaphysical manner, which is so outrageously disgusting, that one can scarcely contain oneself under the lecture.—This man, too, this consummate booby of an author, has his *scheme*; his *remedy*; and he makes no doubt, not he, that, if his *scheme* were adopted, all would be well again.—When I come, in my closing letters, to speak of the different schemes of these pamphleteers, I shall, perhaps, notice DAVIS GIDDY's amongst the rest; but, I cannot help noticing, here, one *falshood*, a downright *falshood*, which he has asserted, and, I think there is but too much reason to suppose, that it is also a *wilful falshood*.—He says, that the Bank Notes are, *in effect*, a legal tender; and that, "not a single individual has been found, in fourteen years, amidst the infinite variety of opinions and circumstances existing in that time, who has VENTURED to decline these notes, and to demand cash."—What does he mean by *declining notes*? The *demand of cash* is clear, and the assertion is a clear *falshood*; for, as has been shown, in the last volume of the Register, page 1285, notes of the Bank of England were refused and cash demanded, in 1801; that the Plaintiff obtained a verdict; and that, upon argument before the judges, the verdict was confirmed.—DAVIS GIDDY, Esq. may say, that he *never reads the Political Register*. So much the worse

for him ; for, if he had, he could not have been ignorant of this fact. He, however, who is a “learned friend,” ought to read law books. It is his trade to do that as much as it is that of a chimney-sweeper to carry a soot-bag. Indeed, it is not to be believed, that he had not read this case. At any rate, either he had read it, and has, of course, published a wilful falsehood ; or, he is grossly ignorant of what he ought to have been well informed of, before he attempted to put pen to paper upon this subject.—The fact is, that any man may demand payment of any legal debt in the coin of the realm, except debts due from the Bank of England itself. I do not say that any of the miscreants, who bargain for their borough votes, could demand the payment in coin ; I do not say, that any of these possessors of the precious privilege of voting ; I do not say that they could demand, and obtain, the wages of their corruption in coin ; but, I know, that any man may demand and obtain payment, in coin, of any legal debt.—It seemed to me necessary to say these few words upon Mr. DAVIS GIDDY’s pamphlet ; and having so done, I shall now dismiss this subject, till we have the debate of to-morrow before us.

PORtUGAL. THE WAR.—Since my last, the THANKS of the two Houses of Parliament have been voted to Lord Talavera and his army.—I am always glad of occasions to praise the army, or any part of it, and to defend, or any part of it, when need is.—I dare, that the army has behaved very well upon this occasion, or, at least, I see nothing to make me suspect the contrary ; but, at the same time, I do not see sufficient reason, or any reason at all, for *particular* thanks to it at this time.

—If, indeed, the commander of an army is to be thanked when *no victory* is obtained ; if victory be not essential in the grounds of thanks ; then there may be room for *dispute* upon this point ; but, if victory be essential, then I would not have thanked this commander, for I have seen no official account of any victory that he has obtained since the time that he was last thanked and titled and pensioned for three generations.—What, then, are the grounds of this new *Thanking* ? What has he *achieved* ? He has *cleared Portugal of the French*. The French have, indeed, marched to the frontiers of Portugal ; they have, perhaps, entered Spain ; they have fallen back ; they have retreated ; nay,

they have, perhaps, run away. What then ? They did not do this in consequence of any victory gained over them by him. He did not *beat* them ; he did not *drive* them back ; he did not even *attack* them. This, at least, is what we are told in all the intelligence upon the subject.—That they would not have retreated, if there had been no army opposed to them is certain ; but, how long were they suffered to lie unmolested in the face of that army ? Besides, to clear Portugal of the French ; the French must have first been in Portugal ; and, how came he to let the French enter Portugal ? “They “were too strong for him. He could not “help it.” Why, then did he go to the Frontier to meet them ? Or, if there before he knew their strength, why did he not retreat *sooner* towards Lisbon, and not remain till the pursuit of him became so injurious to his army and to the country ?—This question of, *why did he go to the frontier*, was, I perceive, attempted to be answered by MR. PERCEVAL, when he moved for the thanks, on the 26th of April.—I will quote his words, as I find them in the MORNING CHRONICLE.—“Why “then, it may be asked, did he go to the “frontiers ? It is to be considered, how- “ever, that one of the objects which he “had in view, was to acquire time for the “discipline of the Portuguese army ; that “another of these objects was to gain time, “for the arrival of reinforcements from this “Country, to be procured from all the “quarters from which they could be “spared ; that he had always in contemplation the difficulty which an enemy “should find in the subsistence of a numer- “ous army, while Portugal continued the “seat of war ; and that if he moved to the “frontiers, it was impossible for the “enemy to operate but in great numbers. “It was for those reasons he thought “proper to carry the war, to keep the war “at a distance ; but it is but justice to “state, that while he was defending Por- “tugal on the banks of the Coa, he was “carrying on the fortifications at Lisbon ; “and that while he was giving security to “the frontiers, he was adding strength to “the heart. When the enemy appeared in “numbers, he then retired to a stronger situa- “tion.”—Now, this appears to me the strangest statement of reasons that ever was heard of in the world.—He wanted time to discipline the Portuguese army. Well, now, if he had remained at Lisbon, be- hind his lines, would he not have had more

time for this purpose, than he could possibly have while he was going to the frontier and coming back again?—Behind his lines at Lisbon, he would have had the whole summer for the work of forming the Portuguese army; but, what time had he while advancing to, and retreating from, the frontier?—He wanted time, too, it seems to get re-inforcements from England. Well, and did his going to the frontier *hasten* these re-inforcements? Did he get them the *sooner* for going to the frontier?—To *keep the war at a distance*, it was, we are told, necessary to *carry the war to a distance*. But, *did* he *keep the war at a distance?* or did he let it work its destructive way to within a few miles of the capital? It might be out of his power to prevent this; but then, why did he go to the frontier? or, being there, why did he not retreat sooner?—He *foresaw*, we are told, that these operations of his would reduce the enemy to great difficulty in supporting their army; and, in a future part of the speech, we are told, how completely this has been verified.—Why, really, there seems to have been no great scope for foresight here. If the French invaded Portugal and devoured all the produce of the country, it was pretty clear that they must go elsewhere to get more; and, it was also pretty clear, that what was devoured or destroyed by our army could not be devoured or destroyed by theirs. But, all this while; all the time this cool calculation about bringing the French into and letting them eat themselves out is going on, we seem to forget what was the professed object of the army under Lord Talavera, namely, the *defence* of Portugal; the *protection* of Portugal against the French.—*Starved out!* Well the French might be starved out, indeed, when they had been suffered to be in Portugal as long as there was any thing to be found to eat.—What was the progress?—The French came up to the Portuguese Frontiers, where Lord Talavera and his army lay. They took Almeida from a garrison that he had placed in it; they then marched against him; and he retreated before them to within a few miles of Lisbon. He there gets behind his lines; he receives reinforcement upon reinforcement, and supplies upon supplies. The French, he himself tells us, are destitute of all necessaries from the first moment of their arrival. Still there they lie for about five or six months facing him; and, when they have eaten up the country, they go

off of their own accord, without being defeated, and even without being attacked.—What *victory* is there thus far? What is there here to boast of? What is there here to which the epithet *glorious* can be applied?—And, what has happened since the retreat of the French began? What *victory* has been gained by the person thanked? I have often looked for the return of *prisoners*; but, I have yet seen none. If thousands were taken during such a retreat, what would that be? It would be hardly worth naming; yet, I repeat that I have not seen any return of prisoners.—I have observed, that, in the volumes of eulogies, written upon this occasion; that in all the boastings about driving the French out of Portugal, not a word has been said about *numbers*. Yet, this is a most important point. It was said, in the debate of the 26th of April, in the House of Commons, that we have now 60,000 of our troops and 40,000 Portuguese troops in Portugal. Here are *a hundred thousand men!* We are not told how many Massena has; but, it never was pretended, that he had more than 70 or 80 thousand when he *entered* Portugal; and the reader knows well what *dysenteries* and *fevers* and *starvations* and *desertions* the French army has experienced. Is there, then, any *glory* in having seen such an army retreat before 60,000 English troops and 40,000 Portuguese “as good as any troops in the world?”—Why was not this point of *numbers* touched upon? In such a case it is every thing. Without it who is to be able to estimate the merit even of a decisive victory? The first question always asked, in such cases, is, what was the *force*? What was the *strength* of the two armies? Was the *victor* weakest, or was he the *strongest*? And, in cases of *retreat*, surely there can be no glory to the pursuer, if he be in point of numbers greatly superior to the party pursued?—If to be the pursuing party in a case like this be so greatly meritorious, was Massena entitled to no merit when he pursued Talavera? Aye, but he was *drawn after* into a *trap*. Where is the proof of that? He is in no trap now, and he has not been *hurt*. And, who yet knows, what is to be the end of all these marchings and counter-marchings?—The two armies are just where they were a year ago; except, that the French still possess one fortress in Portugal, which they did not then possess. And, what has the cost been? The destruction of a considerable portion of the country, which

we professed it to be our object to *protect*, many millions in taxes upon the people of England, and many more millions added to the National Debt.—What, then, are these *Thanks* for? There is no *victory*; and as to the *political consequences*, even if it were proper to thank a military commander for them, they have been, and are, I am fully convinced, such as we ought to lament rather than rejoice at, and such as we must lament, if we see the thing in its proper light; for, it is the *lingering* of this war that we have to dread. What good has been done, if the French remain facing our army now? Can we maintain an army *constantly* upon the Portuguese frontier? Can we carry on the war as *principals* in Spain and Portugal for any length of time? As well might it be asserted, that we could hold those kingdoms as colonies.—For these reasons, and some others which I shall state another time, I would never have given my assent to this vote of thanks; and, we shall see, in the end, whose opinions are correct.—The two are where they were a *twelve-month ago*, and half Portugal, which we wished to defend, has, since that time, been *laid waste and ravaged*. That alone is enough for me. I can, under such circumstances (to say nothing about the *cost*), give no thanks either to the planners or the executors of the war.

W^M. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Tuesday,
April 30, 1811.*

JUBILEE DOLLARS.

SIR;—In perusing Mr. Hoare's Letter to the Bank, I was struck with the discordant opinions which prevail in respect of the circulating medium; one party, as he observes, contending that paper has no influence upon exchange price, plenty, or scarcity of Bullion, and the other upholding an opinion decidedly the reverse. It is clear that men at all familiar with the principles of finance could not differ so essentially upon a point of such considerable moment, if it were not for the obscurity and difficulty with which it is involved; for if it admitted of any thing like a short mathematical demonstration, the confused and various opinions afloat must long since have yielded to a clear intelligence upon the subject. That Bank Paper carries with it very much the appearance of depreciation, must be admitted when a guinea will exchange for

so much more than a pound note and a shilling, as it did in the recent case of the Mail Coach Guard who was examined before the Lord Mayor. It may be said however, that this is by no means irresistible evidence of a depreciation, as it is possible that the Coin may have increased in value while Bank Paper has remained stationary. Because my companion has grown taller than myself, my height is not in consequence diminished.—But I confess this is a mere verbal quibble; for if I had preserved by me one hundred pounds in Gold Coin which I unfortunately exchanged for the same nominal amount in Bank notes, I should at this moment have been richer by the difference between the present relative value of the guinea and the note. In this case therefore, having improvidently exchanged my Coin for Paper, I should be an absolute loser to the extent I have noticed; and when we speak of the depreciation of currency, we have loss in view; and therefore, whether we make use of the term "depreciation," or not, the fact is unaltered, and consequently all discussion upon the word itself is mere idling; having however the mischief of removing us from a fair consideration of the utility or disadvantage of the present Issue of Paper, instead of assisting us in the solution of that important question. Now Mr. Cobbett, as I am of opinion that you have as clear a view of the principles of finance as most men, not excepting that Polar Star, Sir John Sinclair, I wish to trouble you with a few remarks as they occur to me, and shall feel thankful to be corrected by your pen wherever I have entertained any idea that is erroneous. The mischief of a paper currency is not immediate, and therefore not directly discoverable, but it arises from that laxity of public and private economy which a profusion or redundancy of wealth must invariably produce. A large circulation of currency has the necessary effect of suddenly increasing the demand for the necessities of life, as well as all other articles of consumption; and an increased demand, unless accompanied with a concurrent and contemporaneous supply, will unavoidably occasion a considerable rise in the prices. If the effect of an extended circulating medium were to afford the means of purchasing the necessities of life to him who otherwise could have no such opportunity, it might be hailed as a blessing; but this is a very fallacious view of the subject:

the circulating coin of every commercial country must be adequate (if not dissipated by forced Issues of Paper) to the fair demand of necessaries; but the redundancy of a paper currency, converts economy into extravagance, and the demand that was before only equal to the comforts of life is now enlarged to meet the calls of profusion and dissipation. In some manufactures, this forced consumption may meet a supply, and here the price of the article will not be materially increased; but with the necessities of life in which the efforts of man are less successful and less productive, a very serious increase in price must eventually be the consequence. The facility which paper currency affords to public and individual extravagance is evident: suppose, for example, that I called upon my neighbour for the loan of 100*l.* if coin were the only circulating medium, it is not improbable that his circumstances might be of a nature not to admit of such a floating sum in his hands beyond a sufficiency to answer his own demands; and in this case I should be refused; but, at present, if he have no such sum in notes, I have only to ask him to put his name to a Bill of Exchange for that amount, and I convert it with all imaginable ease into the paper currency of the Bank, which will answer all the purpose of coin. Can a greater, or more mischievous incentive to dissipation be imagined? But is the evil limited to public and individual profusion? does it not poison the very root of commerce, and provoke that reprehensible speculation which has tended so long to disgrace our Gazettes with bankruptcies, and fill the columns of our daily prints with the accounts of failures all over the kingdom? —With regard to the price of Bullion, and the exchange against this country, that depends clearly (I should imagine) upon the extent of the exportation of coin for the maintenance of our armies abroad, and for the importation of the commodities of a foreign country which will not receive any commodities of ours in exchange. It is evident that all importations under such circumstances, should be as much as possible checked; but paper currency is the strongest and most powerful of all engines for the continuance of such a disadvantageous trade, because it enables the merchant to drain the country of coin to the last shilling, to pay foreigners for their merchandize. In this latter point of view,

nothing more baneful or injurious to the welfare of this country can be contemplated; and Bank paper is at this moment a species of bonus to those who will exert themselves most in draining the country of its coin. This unnatural foreign trade, which the Bank paper tends so much to encourage, is of the greatest mischief in the present exigency of silver coin, as it causes that traffic in bullion which leads to those competitions in the purchase of coin, of which the mail-coach guard is recently a proof; and so long as that traffic remains, all the Dollars that the Bank can issue will be but as a drop in the ocean in the supply of silver coin, as they must necessarily, as it appears to me, vanish as soon as issued. Another alarming consequence that this purchasing of bullion will create, is the public feeling as to the relative value of coin and paper; for what an extraordinary predilection for the former must be occasioned by the knowledge, that in exchanging some months since one hundred pounds in coin for so much of paper of the same nominal value, the difference of five shillings in the pound has been lost to the owner of the coin. Let a man possess what depths of reasoning he may; let him be as true a disciple as you please of that luminary of finance, Sir John Sinclair, still he must, if he have the choice, prefer coin to Bank paper; but if he would do so, how much more will such a disposition be cherished by those, who, unacquainted with any theoretical speculations, are solely governed by passing occurrences: will you persuade such men as these, who see that a guinea has sold for twenty-five shillings, (and these men form the great mass of society) will you persuade them, to part with coin for paper of a like nominal value; or if they happen to have more coin than they want for immediate use, will you persuade them to buy stock with it? not even so sanguine a man as Mr. Randall Jackson could expect it. Then what is to prevent hoarding if Bank paper is to continue equal to a legal tender? and if hoarding and exportation remain, what human power can alleviate the present dearth of silver. These remarks, I am aware, are but hasty, and if they are fallacious, and distant from the causes of the present scarcity of coin, and alarming prices of the necessities of life, as they probably are, you will oblige an old correspondent by pointing out his mistakes, and infusing into his brain a small portion

of the financial illumination of the spirit.
I am, Sir, &c. W. F. S.—*Lincoln's Inn,*
April 27, 1811.

PROPOSITIONS RESPECTING MONEY, BULLION AND EXCHANGES.—*26th April 1811.*

I. That the right of establishing and regulating the legal Money of this Kingdom hath at all times been a royal prerogative, vested in the sovereigns thereof, who have from time to time exercised the same as they have seen fit, in changing such legal Money, or altering and varying the value, and enforcing or restraining the circulation thereof, by Proclamation, or in concurrence with the Estates of the Realm by Act of Parliament: and that such legal Money cannot lawfully be defaced, melted down or exported.

II. That the Promissory Notes of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England are engagements to pay certain sums of Money in the legal Coin of this Kingdom; and that for more than a century past, the said Governor and Company were at all times ready to discharge such Promissory Notes in legal Coin of the Realm, until restrained from so doing on the 25th of February 1797, by his Majesty's Order in Council, confirmed by Act of Parliament.

III.—That the Promissory Notes of the said Company have hitherto been, and are at this time, held to be equivalent to the legal Coin of the Realm, in all pecuniary transactions to which such Coin is legally applicable.

IV.—That at various periods, as well before as since the said Restriction, the exchanges between Great Britain and several other countries have been unfavourable to Great Britain: and that during such periods, the prices of Gold and Silver Bullion, especially of such Gold Bullion as could be legally exported, have frequently risen above the Mint price; and the coinage of Money at the Mint has been either wholly suspended or greatly diminished in amount: and that such circumstances have usually occurred, when expensive naval and military operations have been carried on abroad, and in times of public danger or alarm, or when large importations of Grain from foreign parts have taken place.

V.—That such unfavourable Exchanges, and rise in the price of Bullion, occurred to a greater or less degree during the wars carried on by King William the 3rd and

Queen Ann; and also during part of the seven years war, and of the American war; and during the war and scarcity of grain in 1795 and 1796, when the difficulty increased to such a degree, that on the 25th of February 1797, the Bank of England was restrained from making payments in cash by his Majesty's Order in Council, confirmed and continued to the present time by divers Acts of Parliament; and the Exchanges became afterwards still more unfavourable, and the price of Bullion higher, during the scarcity which prevailed for two years previous to the Peace of Amiens.

VI.—That during the period of 75 years, ending with the 1st of January 1796, and previous to the aforesaid restriction whereof, with the exception of some small intervals, accounts are before the House, the price of Standard Gold in bars has been at or under the Mint price 34 years and 5 months; and above the said Mint price 39 years and 7 months; and that the price of foreign Gold Coin has been at or under 3*l.* 18*s.* per oz. 31 years and 2 months, and above the said price 42 years and 10 months. And that during the same period of 75 years, the price of standard Silver appears to have been at or under the Mint price, 3 years and 2 months only.

VII.—That the unfavourable state of the Exchanges, and the high price of Bullion, do not, in any of the instances above referred to, appear to have been produced by the restriction upon Cash payments at the Bank of England, or by any excess in the issue of Bank Notes; inasmuch as all the said instances, except the last, occurred previously to any restriction on such Cash payments; and because, so far as appears by such information as has been procured, the price of Bullion has frequently been highest, and the exchanges most unfavourable, at periods, when the issues of Bank Notes have been considerably diminished, and to have been afterwards restored to their ordinary rates, although those issues have been increased.

VIII.—That during the latter part and for sometime after the close of the American war, during the years 1781, 1782 and 1783, the exchange with Hamburg fell, from 34.1 to 31.5, being about 8 per cent.; and the price of foreign gold rose from 3*l.* 17*s.* 6*d.* to 4*l.* 2*s.* 3*d.* per oz. and the price of Dollars from 5*s.* 4*½d.* per oz. to 5*s.* 11*¼d.* and that the Bank Notes in circulation were reduced between March

1782 and December 1782, from 9,160,000*l.* to 5,995,000*l.* being a diminution of above one third, and continued (with occasional variations) at such reduced rate until December 1784: and that the exchange with Hamburgh rose to 34. 6, and the price of gold fell to 3*l.* 17*s.* 6*d.* and Dollars to 5*s.* 1*½d.* per oz. before the 25th February 1787, the amount of Bank Notes being then increased to 8,688,000*l.*

IX.—That the amount of Bank Notes in February 1787 was 8,688,000*l.* and in February 1791 11,699,000*l.*; and that during the same period, the sum of 10,704,000*l.* was coined in Gold; and that the exchange with Hamburgh rose about 3 per cent.

X.—That between the 25th of February 1795, and the 25th of February 1797, the amount of Bank Notes was reduced from 13,539,000*l.* to 8,640,000*l.* during which time the exchange with Hamburgh fell from 36 to 35, being about 3 per cent., and the said amount was increased to 11,855,000*l.* exclusive of 1,542,000*l.* in Notes of 1*l.* and 2*l.* each on the 1st of February 1798, during which time the exchange rose to 38. 2, being about 9 per cent.

XI.—That the average price of Wheat per quarter in England, in the year 1798 was 50*s.* 3*d.*; in 1799, 67*s.* 5*d.*; in 1800, 113*s.* 7*d.*; in 1801, 118*s.* 3*d.*; and in 1802, 67*s.* 5*d.*

The amount of Bank Notes, of 5*l.* and upwards

in 1798, about £11,527,000	
under £.5 ... 1,810,000	13,337,000
in 1799, about 12,408,500	
under £.5 ... 1,653,800	14,062,300
in 1800, about 13,421,900	
under £.5 ... 1,831,800	15,253,700
in 1801, about 13,454,300	
under £.5 ... 2,715,100	16,169,400
in 1802, about 13,917,900	
under £.5 ... 3,136,400	17,054,300

That the exchange with Hamburgh was, in January 1798, 38. 2; January 1799, 37. 7; January 1800, 32.; January 1801, 29. 8; being in the whole a fall of above 22 per cent.—In January 1802, 32. 2; and December 1802, 34.; being a rise of about 13 per cent.

XII.—That during all the periods above

referred to, previous to the commencement of the war with France in 1793, the principal States of Europe preserved their independance, and the trade and correspondence thereof were carried on conformably to the accustomed law of nations; and that although from the time of the invasion of Holland by the French in 1795, the trade of Great Britain with the Continent was in part circumscribed and interrupted, it was carried on freely with several of the most considerable ports, and commercial correspondence was maintained at all times previous to the summer of 1807.

XIII.—That since the month of November 1806, and especially since the summer of 1807, a system of exclusion has been established against the British trade on the Continent of Europe, under the influence and terror of the French power, and enforced with a degree of violence and rigor never before attempted; whereby all trade and correspondence between Britain and the continent of Europe has (with some occasional exceptions, chiefly in Sweden and in certain parts of Spain and Portugal) been hazardous, precarious and expensive, the trade being loaded with excessive freights to foreign shipping, and other unusual charges: and that the trade of Britain with the United States of America has also been uncertain and interrupted; and that in addition to these circumstances, which have greatly affected the course of payments between this country and other nations, the Naval and Military Expenditure of the United Kingdom in foreign parts, has for three years past, been very great; and the price of Grain, owing to a deficiency in the crops, higher than at any time, whereof the accounts appear before Parliament, except during the scarcity of 1800 and 1801; and that large quantities thereof have been imported.

XIV.—That the amount of Currency necessary for carrying on the transactions of the Country, must bear a proportion to the extent of its Trade and its public Revenue and Expenditure; and that the annual amount of the Exports and Imports of Great Britain, on an average of three years, ending 5th of January 1797, was 51,199,141*l.* official value; the average amount of Revenue paid into the Exchequer, including the Profit on the Lottery, 19,495,945*l.*; and the average amount of the Total Expenditure of Great Britain, 42,855,111*l.*; and that the average amount

of Bank Notes in circulation (all of which were for 5*l.* or upwards) was about 11,262,000*l.*; and that 57,274,617*l.* had been coined in gold during his Majesty's reign, of which a large sum was then in circulation.

That the annual amount of the Exports and Imports of Great Britain, on an average of three years, ending 5th January 1810, was 70,554,719*l.*; the average amount of Duties paid into the Exchequer 59,960,525*l.*; and the average amount of the Total Expenditure of Great Britain, 77,802,674*l.*; and that the amount of Bank Notes, above 5*l.* on an average of the years 1808 and 1809, was 13,763,000*l.*; and of Notes under 5*l.* about 4,500,000*l.*; and that the amount of Gold Coin in circulation was greatly diminished.

XV.—That the situation of this Kingdom, in respect of its political and commercial relations with foreign countries, as above stated, is sufficient, without any change in the internal value of its currency, to account for the unfavourable state of the foreign Exchanges, and for the high price of Bullion.

XVI.—That it is highly important that the restriction on the payments in Cash of the Bank of England, should be removed, whenever the political and commercial relations of the Country shall render it compatible with the public interest.

XVII.—That under the circumstances affecting the political and commercial relations of this Kingdom with foreign Countries, it would be highly inexpedient and dangerous, now to fix a definite period for the removal of the restriction of Cash Payments at the Bank of England, prior to the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace.

APHORISMS, RELATIVE TO PUBLIC CURRENCY AND CREDIT.

By Sir Richard Phillips.

1. Currency is the medium by which the interchange of commodities is effected, and, being intended to pass as the representative of property, it ought to be of intrinsic value, and always worth the property which it represents.

2. The stability and intrinsic worth of currency is the foundation of the commercial system, and the basis of public confidence in all transactions and considerations relative to property.

3. Gold and silver are among civilized nations the common medium or homogeneous representative of commodities, on account of their beauty, their durability, their susceptibility of being coined, and their intrinsic and absolute worth, arising from the labour expended in procuring them at the mines.

4. Paper, or arbitrary currency, as the result of local or national convention, and as the creature of the will of man, is subject to the fluctuations of public confidence, and liable to the errors and miscalculations which attend all human combinations and arrangements.

5. The circulation of the precious metals, effected by exchanging them for commodities, is natural and regular, while the circulation of artificial currency is necessarily forced, unnatural, and irregular. The one is in its origin the representative of labour, and can only be obtained for property; while a paper, or arbitrary currency, is generally but the representative of credit, and may be obtained by artifice or intrigue.

6. Capital is the basis of trade and social intercourse, when the currency consists of the precious metals; but credit, address, and intrigue, stand in the place of capital, when the national currency can be created, extended, and issued at pleasure.

7. The nominal and relative value of all property will be in proportion to the amount of the currency employed in the circulation of that property; and this can only find its true level when the currency itself, in all the stages of its circulation, is the special representative of transferred property. Increase the amount of the currency, and all commodities will rise in nominal value; or make it bear unequally on particular kinds of property, and these will attain a factitious or unnatural price.

8. The novel mode of putting artificial currency into circulation, by discounting bills or promissory notes, is objectionable and pernicious, because such bills and notes essentially represent nothing but the credit of the parties, may be created at pleasure, and are often likely to represent no real transaction of which commodities are the basis.

9. Such novel mode of issuing the national currency in exchange for notes and bills, affords an undue and dangerous influence to speculators, middle-men, and monopolists, who, to enhance their gains, will not hesitate to increase their accep-

tances and indorsements, as the means of raising an indefinite capital, and thereby of indefinitely extending their speculations.

10. The security of the public against speculators being the natural limits of their capital, it is evident that if, under a system of paper currency, they are enabled to raise unbounded capitals by creating and discounting bills and notes, they will be enabled to accumulate indefinite stocks; and being under no obligation to sell for want of currency, the prices of such property can have no limit besides the conscience and the prudence of the speculators.

11. The hydra of monopoly will therefore have as many heads as there are manufactories, or fountains, of paper currency; a colossal head, representing the metropolitan manufactory, and five hundred other heads, generated by the small manufactories which spread over all parts of the empire, serve as the convenient and necessary engines of monopolists and speculators.

12. As long as the paper currency is simply and solely the representative of specie, and can therefore be exchanged for specie at pleasure, no preference will exist in the public mind in favour of specie; but, as soon as the re-conversion becomes matter of difficulty, a preference will be universally felt; and, as an affair of self-security, every one will hoard specie, to guard his family against the possible contingencies of a vague paper currency.

13. From this feeling arises the present scarcity of specie; the usual quantity having been about twenty-five millions, and the number of families, or inhabited houses, in the United Kingdom, being about three millions, a hoard of eight pounds to a house will account for its total disappearance, without referring to the temptations afforded to foreign traders, to speculating exporters, to subsidies to foreign powers, and to numerous mal-practices of Jews and money dealers.

14. As long as the cause exists which led to the preference of specie over paper, and to the system of hoarding, specie will continue scarce, and will be likely to rise in nominal value, relatively to Bank notes and paper currency: but as soon as paper can be converted on demand into specie, the preference in favour of specie will cease, the hoards will be opened, and specie will become as plentiful as heretofore.

15. The power of Jews and money-dealers to speculate in the specie, and affect its value, will always be in the inverse ratio of the quantity in circulation; and their controul would cease, if the grounds of the hoarding system were removed, and the Bank paid their notes in specie, when the amount of the specie in circulation would of course exceed the compass of their capitals.

16. The Bank of England being the fulcrum on which are balanced the fortunes of the country, it appears to be expedient, at this crisis, to place it under the vigilant controul of a Committee of Parliament; and the private property of the Directors and of the Bank Company, or the pledge of Parliament, ought to be committed to the public as a security for the notes of the Company now in circulation.

17. In like manner, country bankers, who issue paper currency, ought to be called upon to give landed security for the amount of their issues; and these companies, as well as the company of the Bank of England, ought to pay a half rate of interest to the revenue, for the sums which, by the issue of paper currency, they now borrow of the public without interest.

18. The alternative to prevent greater, perhaps irremediable evils, is to dissolve the existing spell by paying specie on demand for Bank notes. The consequent restoration of public confidence would occasion specie to re-appear in quantities too great to be affected by the machinations of speculators. Paper and specie would be again at par. The motive to hoard would be destroyed; alarms would be dissipated; and public prosperity would stand once more on a solid and permanent basis.

Chelsea, April 12, 1811.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—BATTLE OF BARROSA.—*Notes of the Moniteur on Lord Liverpool's Letter to the Lord Mayor of London.—April 4, 1811.*
(Concluded from page 1056.)

Letter—“The British, with the Spaniards attached to them, amounted to 5,000.”

Moniteur—“There were 7,000 English, 8 or 9,000 Spaniards, and 1,000 Portuguese, which makes a total of between sixteen and eighteen thousand men. In the return of wounded officers, you mentioned 11 English regiments, viz. 3 regiments of Guards; the 9th, 28th, 47th,

67th, 82d, 87th, and 95th of the line, and the 2d Hussars, to which is added the 20th Portuguese; in all twelve different corps, making fifteen English battalions, which at 500 each, gives a total of 7,500 men, and (including the 20th Portuguese, of 1,000) of 8,500 men in your pay, who were actually engaged."

Letter.—“Lieut. General Graham, with the troops under his command, had crossed St. Peter’s river, and re-entered the Isle of Leon.”

Moniteur.—“General Graham, you embarked at Cadiz on the 25th of February, and, on the 28th you disembarked at Algesiras, with your division, and the Spaniards. Tell us, then, why you undertook this military promenade, and incurred so large an expence. You intended to turn the line of the Duke of Belluno—have you done it? Your design was to raise the siege of Cadiz; have you done it? If you carried every thing before you, why did you stop half way? It was not in the Isle of Leon, but at Chiclana, which is but a very short distance from it, that the field of battle was, where you expected to take up your quarters on the night of the 5th. You would have taken 100 pieces of cannon, 60 gun-boats, and immense magazines, baggage, hospitals, &c. &c. This was the object of your expedition—have you attained it? You were beaten—you lost half your troops—and you were very near being taken.—Your numbers, and the steadiness of your troops, saved you from entire ruin. Was it, then, merely for the purpose of returning to Cadiz that you left it ten days before? Would it not have been better that you had remained there? You would have had under your command 4,000 more English or Spaniards.”

PORTUGAL.—*Dispatch from Marshal Beresford to Lord Talavera, dated Campo Mayor, March 26, 1811.*

My Lord;—I had communicated to your Excellency my arrival at Arronches with all my forces, except the division of Brigadier General Cole, to which, in consequence of the continued marches it had made, it was judged necessary to give a day’s rest at Portalegre.—On the 24th I caused the troops to move from Arronches for Quinta de Reguenga, a little more than half way to this place, and the division of General Cole for Arronches; and having joined yesterday at ten in the morning, I put the whole in motion for this town. I

could not know the intention of the enemy with respect to this place: but in case he should endeavour to maintain it, I proposed to post myself between him and Badajoz, and thus cut him off from the latter.—We discovered the enemy’s advanced cavalry on the heights of Lopo de Matto about a league distant; but perceiving that we were manœuvring on their flank, they retreated, and some skirmishing took place at the foot of the walls of the town, with the advanced cavalry. When I reached the heights of the place, I discovered the enemy’s force on the outside of the town. I did not, however, know whether or not he was master of the place. There were four regiments of cavalry, the regiment of infantry No. 100, of three battalions, with some horse artillery.—I ordered Brigadier General Long, with the cavalry, to endeavour to turn the enemy’s right, keeping out of the reach of the place. My object was to detain the force of the enemy till some infantry could arrive. The Brigadier made a wider circuit than was intended, so that he more effectually flanked the enemy, and obliged him to retreat hastily, and indeed with extraordinary rapidity. The cavalry advanced upon his right flank, and Brigadier General Long, seeing a favourable opportunity, ordered Colonel Head, with two squadrons of the 13th Light Dragoons, to charge the cavalry of the enemy, which obliged the infantry to fall back to support it. This charge, followed by Col. Otway, with two squadrons of the 7th Portuguese, and supported by General Long with the remainder of that regiment, the 1st Portuguese and the brigade of Colonel De Grey, was made with the most determined courage, and the French were entirely routed, and pursued into the town of Badajoz, two leagues distant, in which flight the greater part of them were sabred, as were the conductors and artillerymen of 16 pieces of cannon, which were taken on the road, but afterwards abandoned. This success, though it occasioned a great loss to the enemy, was in some manner unfortunate, because, not knowing what had been done by the cavalry that had made the charge, and continuing to pursue the infantry with the remaining cavalry and two pieces of artillery for the space of a league, to support the detached body which had advanced, and not having received any notice from it, nor knowing what new force the enemy might send from Badajoz, prudence obliged me to halt with my cavalry

till the infantry could come up. The enemy's infantry, amounting to about 1,200 men, though in much confusion, continued to march in column without halting, notwithstanding we were not more than one hundred and sixty yards distant from them, yet not knowing any thing of the 13th regiment of Dragoons, and the 7th Portuguese, I could not hazard the loss which would have necessarily taken place, even though successful, had I ordered a charge by the heavy brigade, under the command of Colonel de Grey. The attention, firmness, and order of this brigade, composed of the 3rd Dragoon Guards and 4th Dragoons, merits my warmest approbation.—General Long manœuvred with great ability, and made the greatest exertions to moderate the excessive ardour of the cavalry, and regulate their movements. The valour of all was exemplary, particularly of Colonels Head and Otway, and their squadrons; and the only thing to be remarked is, that which is customary with our troops on their first encounter with the enemy—too great an impetuosity.—The loss of the enemy was very considerable, not less than 5 or 600 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. We likewise took a great number of horses and mules; in fact, the enemy abandoned every thing, but we had only means to bring away what is mentioned in the enclosed list, and some carriages, &c. were destroyed. We also suffered some loss, a return of which I have the honour to transmit to you. It was not my intention yesterday to have proceeded to this city, and I was only induced to do so from the prospect of capturing or destroying the force which the enemy had incautiously left there, and which would infallibly have taken place if our cavalry had not compelled the enemy to make a retreat so rapid that the infantry could not come up with it.—After the long marches and fatigue necessarily consequent on them, I sent the troops into cantonments here and at Elvas, for rest and refreshment, and to make the necessary preparations for the ulterior operations recommended by your Excellency. Of the corn and provisions in the place at the time of its surrender to the enemy, the latter had not time to carry any thing away, and they will prove a very opportune assistance to us. The enemy left behind 8,000 rations of biscuit, not expecting so sudden a visit. I have the honour to be, &c.—(Signed)

C. BERESFORD, Marshal.

AMERICAN STATES.—An Act, supplementary to the Act, entitled "An Act concerning the Commercial Intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France and their Dependencies, and for other purposes."

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, in Congress assembled, That no vessel owned wholly by a citizen or citizens of the United States, which shall have departed from a British port prior to the second day of February, one thousand eight hundred and eleven, and no merchandise owned wholly by a citizen or citizens of the United States, imported in such vessel, shall be liable to seizure or forfeiture, on account of any infraction or presumed infraction of the provisions of the Act to which this Act is a supplement.—Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, that in case Great Britain shall so revoke or modify her Edicts, as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, the President of the United States shall declare the fact by proclamation; and such proclamation shall be admitted as evidence, and no other evidence shall be admitted of such revocation or modification in any suit or prosecution which may be instituted under the fourth section of the Act to which this Act is a supplement. And the restrictions imposed, or which may be imposed by virtue of the said Act, shall, from the date of such proclamation, cease and be discontinued.—Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, that until the proclamation aforesaid shall have been issued, the several provisions of the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eighteenth sections of the act, entitled "An act to interdict the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France and their dependencies, and for other purposes," shall have full force, and be immediately carried into effect against Great Britain, her colonies and dependencies: Provided however, that any vessel or merchandise, which may in pursuance thereof be seized, prior to the fact being ascertained, whether Great Britain shall on or before the second day of February, 1811, have revoked or modified her edicts in the manner above mentioned, shall nevertheless be restored on application of the parties on their giving bond with approved sureties to the United States, in a sum equal to the value thereof, to abide the

decision of the proper court of the United States thereon ; and any such bond shall be considered as satisfied if Great Britain shall, on or before the 2d day of February, 1811, have revoked or modified her edicts in the manner abovementioned : Provided also, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect any ships or vessels, or the cargoes of ships or vessels, wholly owned by a citizen or citizens of the United States, which had cleared out for the Cape of Good Hope, or for any port beyond the same, prior to the 10th day of November 1810.

FRANCE.—WAR IN SPAIN.—*Official Report of the Duke of Belluno, relative to the Battle of Barrosa.—PEURTO REAL, March 7, 1811.*

Monseigneur ;—In the early part of February, and during the whole of that month, a great deal of bustle was observed in Cadiz roads. The English had been, doubtless, a great while ready for the expedition which they meditated ; but they were thwarted by the violent and continual rains which fell about the end of January and during great part of the month of February. These rains rendered impracticable all the roads by which they wished to approach us.—On the 27th of January, a strong Spanish column, issuing from the mountains, attempted a *coup-de-main* upon Medina Sidonia ; it was repulsed. The enemy appeared to attach importance to the acquisition of that post ; the occupation of which would have given them facility in manœuvring on our rear, by concealing from us all their movements, and in freely communicating through the mountains with the parties which they would have been able to throw into the country between Xeres and Seville.—About the end of February, a convoy of 200 sail of transports, which contrary winds had long detained in the roads, set sail, and directed their course towards Tarifa.—General Cassagne, who occupied Medina Sidonia, with three battalions, and the 5th regiment of chasseurs, informed me, on the 2nd of March, of the march of the combined Anglo-Spanish army by the valley of the Barbatte, upon Casa Vieja and Medina.—The 4th corps, which is not seriously employed, had it in its power to send me a part of its force. I entreated M. the General Sebastiani to manœuvre

by Estepona, in order to alarm the enemy, and place him in danger, should he execute a movement upon me ; that corps, so numerous and in such good condition, has not been of the least assistance to me.—I ordered from Moron a battalion of voltigeurs, which M. the Marshal Duke of Dalmatia had placed there, directing it to march by Arcos upon Medina, where it would join General Cassagne.—A strong party of the allied army forced a picket of the 2d dragoons, which was at Vejer, to evacuate that position and retire upon Conil.—The intentions of the allied army being now completely manifest, I made the best arrangements which the feeble means I had at my direct disposal placed within my power, for opposing the effort which the enemy was about to make.—After leaving the necessary troops for guarding the lines which are so extended, I assembled 10 battalions of the 1st and 2d divisions with which, on the 3d of March, I marched to take a position at the farm-house of Guerra, the intermediate point between Medina and Chiclana ; and whence I had it in my power to bear upon the enemy, in case he chose to advance by either of these points.—From the 2d to the 4th there was some indecision in the movements of the allied army.—On the evening of the 4th, I ordered General Cassagne to march a strong party of observation upon Casa Vieja, a point where the enemy had strongly posted himself since his arrival.—At three in the morning of the 5th, General Cassagne acquainted me that the enemy had evacuated Casa Vieja, and appeared to be concentrated at Vejer.—On the 2d of March, the Spaniards had passed over from the Isle of Leon some troops from that side of the canal of Santi Petri. I ordered General Villatte to take advantage of the night to attack these troops, and drive them into the sea. Two companies of voltigeurs of the 95th regiment were ordered on that service ; they marched at midnight from the lines of Santi Petri. After overthrowing the advanced guard, they arrived without firing a shot at the *tête-de-pont*, on which the enemy were at work. Our voltigeurs sealed the works, fell with the bayonet on the workmen, who carried their muskets slung at their back, and put them into disorder.

(To be continued.)